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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(i) and 78-29-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT'S PRESENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS OF
GUILTY?
The applicable standard of appellate review is whether the

District Court abused its discretion.

State v, Forsyth, 560 P.2d

337 (Utah 1977).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statutes are reproduced herein as Addendum
"A".

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On October 18, 1991, the Appellant appeared before the

Fourth District Court, Utah County, for his arraignment.

At that

time he entered pleas of guilty to the following counts: Count 1
Theft, a second degree felony; Count 16 Communications Fraud, a
first degree felony; Count 66 Computer Fraud, a second degree
felony; Count 67 Computer Fraud, a second degree felony; Count 68
1

Computer Fraud, a second degree felony; Count 69 Computer Fraud,
a second degree felony; and Count 82 Racketeering, a second
degree felony.
2.

On that same day, immediately after returning to jail,

the Appellant began preparations to withdraw his pleas of guilty.
Transcript of Motion to Set Aside Guilty Pleas, page 17.
3.

On November 8, 1991, the Appellant filed his Motion to

Withdraw Guilty Pleas.

In support of the motion the Appellant

filed his supporting memorandum, the affidavit of Donald Thorup,
and affidavit of James Thorup, which are attached as Addendum
"B".
4.

On December 6, 1991, the Court heard the Appellant's

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas.

At the hearing the Appellant,

his father James B. Thorup, and his brother Richard Thorup
testified on the Appellant's behalf.

Appellant's former counsel,

Vernon Romney, was called as a witness on behalf of the Appellee.
5.

At the hearing on his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas

Don Thorup, the Appellant, testified as follows:
(a)
go to trial.
(b)

That it had always been his expressed intention to
T-6, 13.
That his attorney "badgered" him to plead guilty.

As one example, the Appellant's attorney would tell him, "you're
guilty.

Go ahead and do your time."
(c)

T-8, 9.

That as his attorney was unable to convince him to

plead guilty, his attorney strongly urged the Appellant's father
to convince the Appellant to plead guilty.
2

T-9.

(d)

That he and his father are extremely close.

the time, his father was terminally ill.

At

He considered his

father7s instructions to plead guilty as one of his father's last
wishes.

T-ll.
(e)

That even until the date set for arraignment

before the District Court (at which time he did enter into the
plea agreement) his intention was to plead not guilty.
(f)

T-10.

That he did not receive the information or any

documents pertaining to his case prior to entering his guilty
pleas.

T-16.
(g)

That he quickly reviewed the plea agreement just

prior to entering into the agreement.

While reviewing the plea

agreement he voiced his objection to the language in the
statement that he had devised a scheme, or had acted
intentionally or willfully.

His attorney told him to not be

concerned as that was the "standard language they use."

He again

stated his reluctance as he did not scheme or intentionally or
willfully do anything and objected to the language in the
statement.

Again, his attorney told him that it was standard

language and he should sign the agreement.
(h)

T-15, 16.

That his family's money was running out and that

his attorney would not represent him any longer.
(i)

T-17, 33, 34.

That during the plea hearing, even while the Court

was reviewing the plea agreement, the Appellant wanted to tell
the Court that he was not guilty.
(j)

T-20.

That during the arraignment, he was "meek" and
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uncommitted; that his attorney poked him in the side and said,
"Don, speak up and make the judge think you really want to do
this."

T-2 0.
(k)

That had it not been for the pressures placed upon

him by his father and his attorney, and if he had been fully
advised as to what he was signing, he would not have pled guilty.
(1)

That within hours of pleading guilty he mustered

the courage to stand by his convictions and began the process of
withdrawing his pleas.
6.

T-17.

At the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas,

Vernon Romney, the Appellant's prior counsel, testified that:
(a)

He had "strongly urged" the Appellant to plead

guilty, to the extent of poking Don with his elbow in an attempt
to get the Appellant to unequivocally plead.
(b)

T-100, 101.

The Appellant had always been hesitant to plead

guilty, even up to an hour before the hearing was to convene.

T-

85.
(c)
to trial.
7.

The Appellant had often spoken of taking the case

T-94.
At the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas,

James Thorup, the Appellant's father, testified that:
(a)

He and the Appellant spoke many times following

the Appellant's arrest.

During most of those conversations the

Appellant indicated his intention to go to trial.
(b)

T-40, 41.

Based on his conversations with the Appellant's

attorney, at which the attorney said, "Don won't listen to me,
4

but maybe he'll listen to you," he strongly urged his son to
plead guilty.
(c)

T-41.
His health had been failing; that he believed the

Appellant would be persuaded by his wishes.
8.

T-48.

At the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas,

Richard Thorup, the Appellant's brother testified that:
(a)

Following the hearing at which the Appellant pled

guilty, he met with the Appellant's attorney.
(b)

At that meeting, the Appellant's attorney stated

that in order to persuade the Appellant to plead guilty, he
appealed to the Appellant on three levels: as his attorney, as a
friend, and as a Mormon bishop.
9.

T-108.

The Court took the Appellant's Motion to Withdraw

Guilty Pleas under advisement.
10.

On December 11, 1991, the Court entered its ruling

denying the Appellant's motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, which is
attached at Addendum "C".
11.

On January 17, 1992, the Appellant appeared before the

Court for sentencing.

The Court's judgement and sentence ordered

that the Appellant be confined in the Utah State Prison on Count
1, Theft, a second degree felony, for an indeterminate term of
not less than one (1) year nor for more than fifteen (15) years;
on Count 16, Communications Fraud, a first degree felony, for a
period of not less than five (5) years and which may be for the
rest of his life; Count 66, Computer Fraud, a second degree
felony, of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15)

5

years; Count 67, Computer Fraud, a second degree felony, of not
less than one (1) year nor for more than fifteen (15) years;
Count 68, Computer Fraud, a second degree felony, for not less
than one (1) year nor for more than fifteen (15) years; Count 69,
Computer Fraud, a second degree felony, for not less than one (1)
year nor for more than fifteen (15) years; and Count 82,
Racketeering, a second degree felony, for not less than one (1)
year nor for more than fifteen (15) years.
to run concurrently.

Said sentences were

Further, the Court ordered that the

Appellant pay restitution as a condition of parole.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 allows criminal defendants to
withdraw their guilty pleas for "good cause shown."

One of the

few judicially established indicia of good cause is the voluntary
nature of a plea.
(Utah 1987).

State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041-42

In general, motions to withdraw pleas of guilty,

which are made prior to sentencing, should be liberally allowed.
Id.
In the instant case the Appellant demonstrated to the Fourth
Judicial District Court that his pleas of guilty were not
voluntarily made.

The Appellant, in one induced and momentary

lapse of weakness, pled guilty to charges for which he wishes to
stand by his original pleas of not guilty.

The immense pressures

he received from his attorney and family and his inability to
finance further representation by the attorney of his choice led
6

him to plead guilty.

Within hours of pleading guilty the

Appellant regained his autonomy and began the process of
retracting his guilty pleas as the Appellant was doing what
others wanted him to do.

His pleas were not voluntary.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION
BY NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the Appellant's Motion, made prior to
sentencing, to withdraw his plea of guilty.

According to 77-13-6

of the Utah Code a defendant is allowed to withdraw a guilty plea
for good cause.

In State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987),

the Court ruled that good cause is shown when a plea is not
knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily made.

In State v.

Forsyth. 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977), the Court recognized that a
plea is not voluntary if a defendant was under undue influence,
coercion or improper inducement.
State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987) is particularly
instructive because of its parallels with the case at bar.

In

Galleqos. the defendant was charged with various crimes of sexual
deviance.

At the preliminary hearing the alleged victim

presented damning testimony of the events giving rise to the
criminal action.

Faced with a jury trial for multiple offenses,

and because of the testimony given, the defendant pled guilty to
one count of aggravated sexual assault.
Prior to sentencing, the victim recanted her testimony.
7

She

presented evidence which clearly showed that her parents had
pressured her into perjuring her testimony.

Although such

pressure was not disputed, the district court denied the
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
In Gallegos the Court set forth the rationales for allowing
a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.

One of the

rationales was to allow a defendant tc? undo a plea that was not
voluntarily entered.

When viewing the particular facts of the

instant case in their totality it becomes clear that the
Appellant's guilty pleas were not voluntarily rendered.

At all

times prior to, and including the hearing itself, the Appellant
intended to cling to his innocence, face his accusers, and
attempt to receive vindication from the trial process.
The Appellant knew that his family's money was running out
and that he may not be able to afford the representation he
desired if he continued to trial.

Just hours before the plea

hearing, the Appellant asked his lawyer if he would represent the
Appellant at trial. While Mr. Romney's answer is disputed, it is
fair to say that he appeared more than reluctant to proceed to a
trial setting.
Mr. Romney admits that both he and the Appellant's father
"strongly urged" the Appellant to plead guilty.

In fact, Mr.

Romney admits that during the plea hearing he used his elbow to
strike the Appellant in an attempt to "urge" him to speak.

While

the parties may dance around the semantic meanings of "strongly
urge" and "coercion or undue influence," the recipient of such an
8

elbow, delivered by one who had for quite some time "strongly
urged" him to plead guilty, demonstrates the Appellant's
uncertainty as well as the involuntary nature of his pleas of
guilty.
Richard Thorup, the Appellant's brother, testified that
Appellant's counsel stated that in order to induce the Appellant
to plead guilty he used his influence' as a lawyer, friend and
Mormon bishop.

While an attorney's advice is often sought and

often followed, the Appellant had made it clear to his counsel
that he did not wish to plead guilty.

Counsel's insistence, on

so many levels, created far more pressure than an individual who
must make a rational well-thought decision should be forced to
bear.
In what seems the most telling evidence of all, as soon as
the Appellant entered his guilty pleas he began deliberations to
withdraw them.

There was not a lapse of any significant time,

nor can it be said that the Appellant brought his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas as he was dissatisfied with the
sentence he received as the motion was filed prior to sentencing.
The Appellant knew he made the wrong decision and he immediately
started the process to remedy his mistake.

9

CONCLUSION
A criminal defendant is allowed to withdraw his plea of
guilty when he can show good cause.
plea was not voluntarily made.

Good cause exists when a

A plea is not voluntary if a

defendant was under undue coercion, influence or improper
inducement*

The evidence presented to the trial court

demonstrated that the Appellant's guilty pleas were not
voluntarily made due to the inducement, coercion and improper
influence of others.
Following his arrest, Appellant made clear his intention to
go to trial.

Regardless of whether the decision was poor or

wise, Appellant's counsel had a duty to allow the Appellant to do
as he wished.

If counsel did not wish to repretsent the Appellant

at trial, he could have withdrawn.

Instead, trial counsel

continued to pressure the Appellant to plead guilty.

Failing at

that task, Appellant's counsel then convinced Appellant's family
that the Appellant should plead guilty.

The Appellant's family

then brought its influence upon the Appellant.
It is not unusual for people who are faced with decisions to
consult with others and to ask for advice.

The recipient of the

information can either find the advice persuasive and act upon
the advice or find the advice inapplicable and reject the advice.
In either of these situations the recipient is using his own
intellect and his own mind to make the decision.
In the instant case the Appellant had decided to cling to
his innocence and proceed to trial.
10

Believing that the Appellant

had made the wrong decision the Appellant's counsel brought his
considerable pressure upon the Appellant and his family.
considerable and unbearable pressure broke a barrier.

This

This

pressure flattened and nullified the Appellant's decision-making
ability.

The Appellant did not decide to plead guilty.

It is

more accurate to say that the Appellant gave in to the awesome
pressures that had already made this decision for him.

The

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find that the
trial court abused its discretion in not granting the Appellant's
motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty.
Dated this 13th day of July, 1992.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
/

- / -

Halrry Caston
^Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

12

77-13-6.
(1)
(2)

Withdrawal of plea.

A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(a)
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b)
A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion,
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3)
This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule
65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

78-2-2.

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(1)
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.
(2)
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its order,
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3)
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)
a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b)
cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c)
discipline of lawyers;
(d)
final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e)
final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating
with:
(i)
the Public Service Commission;
(ii)
the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestiy;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining; or
(v)
the state engineer;
(f)
final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g)
a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of
the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h)
interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a
first degree or capital felony.
(i)
appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony;

ADDENDUM B
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HARRY CASTON (4 009)
SHAWN D. TURNER (5813)
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
v.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW
PLEA OF GUILTY
Case No. 911002746 FS

DON RALPH THORUP
Judge George E. Ballif
Defendant

FACTS
1.

On October 18, 1991 the defendant appeared before the

Court and entered a plea of guilty to the following counts of the
amended information: Count 1 Theft, a second degree felony; Count
16 Communications Fraud, a first degree felony; Count 66 Computer
Fraud, a second degree felony; Count 67 Computer Fraud, a second
degree felony; Count 68 Computer Fraud, a second degree felony;
Count 69 Computer Fraud, a second degree felony; and Count 82
Racketeering, a second degree felony.
2.

Sentencing has been set for November 15, 1991.

3.

That the defendant states in his affidavit:

2
(a)

He believes absolutely in his innocence.

always and continues to stand by his innocence.

He has

His plea of guilty

was made under the following conditions:
(1)

His attorney insisted that if he pled guilty

the maximum term of imprisonment he would receive would be five (5)
years.

As he later discovered this information was incorrect.
(2)

Despite his attorney insisting that he plead

guilty he stood his ground.

His counsel then began contacting his

family, especially his father, and convinced his family that he
should plead guilty.

He has always wanted to please his father.

His attorney has been a friend of his family for the last two (2)
or three (3) years. He believes his attorney knew of his emotional
attachment to his father and played on his feelings for his father.
(3)

As his family is extremely important to the

defendant and as they were helping to finance his defense, their
subsequent influence on him was more than he could bear.
(4)

He never had the opportunity to review the

documents that were in his attorney's possession.
of the pleadings

or correspondence

related

He never saw any

to his

case until

approximately forty-five (45) minutes before entering the plea on
October 18, 1991.

At that time his attorney presented him only

with the Statement of Defendant.

He was then told to "glance at

the first few pages, you don't have to read the whole thing, then
sign it in Court before the Judge."

At that time he voiced his

objection to the language in the Statement, including that the
defendant had devised a scheme, or had acted intentionally and

3
wilfully.

He was told by his attorney to not be concerned as that

was the "standard language they use."

The defendant argued back

that he did not scheme or intentionally and wilfully do anything,
and he strongly objected to the language in the Statement.

He was

told again by his attorney that it was the "standard language" and
that he should sign it.
(5)

At

the

time

of

entering

his

plea,

he was

experiencing the family pressure mentioned above, his business had
failed, he was in jail and could not make the $200,000.00 bail, and
his attorney indicated he could not represent the defendant if the
matter went to trial.
(6)

Even

at

the

arraignment

when

the

Court

repeatedly asked him if he was sure of what he was doing, he wanted
to blurt out that he did not want to plead guilty and that instead
he stood by his innocence and wanted to go to trial.

His attorney

observed his hesitation in answering the Court, and he poked the
defendant in the side of his abdomen and urged him to enter the
plea.
(7)

He begs the Court to allow him to withdraw his

plea of guilty and allow him to stand trial so that he may have a
jury determine his innocence.
4.

The defendants father, James B. Thorup, has filed an

affidavit in which he states:
(a)

He has known the defendant's prior attorney, Vernon

Romney, for approximately three (3) years.
trusted friend of the family.

Vernon had become a

4
(b)

Mr. Romney continually told him that the defendant

should plead guilty to his criminal charges.

As he stated above,

he has known Mr, Romney for the last three (3) years.

Mr. Romney

is a respected attorney and he therefore believed him when he told
James Thorup that the defendant should plead guilty.

He trusted

his authority and trusted that he was acting in the defendant's
best interest.
(c)

Mr. Romney convinced him that pleading guilty would

be the best thing for the defendant.
the defendant

Therefore*, he began urging

to listen to Mr. Romney and plead guilty.

The

defendant continually, from the time of his arrest, objected to
pleading guilty and verbalized his objections to his father and to
Mr. Romney repeatedly.

James Thorup convinced the defendant to

listen to Mr. Romney and follow his advice.
(d)

As

the weeks went

by

prior

to

the

defendant's

arraignment, he became increasingly doubtful that Mr. Romney was
acting

in

the

defendant's

best

interest.

He

received

the

impression that Mr. Romney just wanted to hurry and get the matter
over with so that he could extricate himself from it.

Mr. Romney

indicated to him that he would not represent the defendant if the
matter went to trial.
(e)

Several weeks before the defendant's arraignment,

Mr. Romney came to James Thorup's home to discuss the case with his
other son, Richard Thorup.

Richard and James Thorup told Mr.

Romney that they could not give him any more money up front, that
they would have to be billed for services rendered and pay the
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legal fees as best they could on a monthly basis.

Mr. Romney told

them, "Perhaps you should get a public defender." Mr. Romney again
indicated he would not help the defendant if he pleaded not guilty
and the matter went to trial.
(f)

On the day of the arraignment, October 18, 1991,

before he met with his counsel, the defendant told him he still did
not want to plead guilty.

Again, he begged the defendant to listen

to his attorney and follow his instructions.
(g)

At the arraignment, which he attended, he heard

Judge Ballif ask the defendant if he was absolutely certain he
wanted to plead guilty.

It was his impression that the Judge was

concerned that the defendant was unaware of what he was doing.

He

was highly and favorably impressed with the Judge, and sensed a
sincere concern on his part for the defendant's rights.

He began

to think the defendant should plead not guilty so that this matter
could go to trial and the defendant would have the opportunity to
have his innocence judged by a jury.
(h)

After the arraignment, the defendant contacted him

at home and told him what had been contained in the Statement of
Defendant which he had signed before the Judge.

James Thorup was

alarmed at the language contained therein which indicated that the
defendant had schemed and willfully and intentionally attempted to
commit the crimes with which he was charged.
father clearly
mistake.

The defendant's

realized then that the guilty plea had

been a

He told the defendant he should not have signed the

Statement and should not have pled guilty.

He regrets that he

6
allowed Mr. Romney to convince him that the defendant should plead
guilty.
(j)

He begs the Court to allow the defendant to withdraw

his plea of guilty and allow him to stand trial.
5.

That Rule 77-13-6 of the Utah Code, 1953 as amended

states: "(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn
only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court".

ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEAS

The statutory authorization for withdrawal of a plea of guilty
is found in Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code. This section states:
(2)(a) "A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of the court; (b) "A request to
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion, and
shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea".
Applicable to the instant case is the language used by the
court in State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977).

Although the

court did not find good cause to set aside the defendant's plea of
guilty, the court stated:
We are in full agreement with the proposition
that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must
appear that the accused had
a clear
understanding of the charge and without undue
influence (emphasis added), coercion, or
improper inducement and voluntarily entered
his plea....and that the defendant understood
and weighed the alternatives he had and chose
the one which he thought most beneficial to

7
him....it is the duty of the trial court to
see that the interests of justice are served
by not allowing a person to enter a plea of
guilty to a crime he has not committed...
Id at 338,339.
The defendant interprets the above quote to mean that if the
defendant doesn't know what the charges are, if he does not
understand the charges or if his decision-making abilities have
been influenced, good cause exists to allow him to withdraw his
plea.
Good cause exists in the instant case sufficient to allow the
defendant to withdraw his pleas of guilty.

The defendant states

that he did not review the pleadings that were in his attorney's
possession.

Without reviewing these documents which included the

amended information, the defendant could not fully and completely
understand

what

he

had

been

charged

with,

and

of

greater

significance the defendant could not understand what it was that
the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
The most crucial aspect of the defendant's affidavit is that
his pleas of guilty were the result of influence by his attorney
and his family.

The defendant continually stated to his attorney

that he did not want to plead guilty.

He wanted to stand by the

rights guaranteed him by the constitutions of the United States of
America and the State of Utah, and remain innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

It was the defendant's intent

to stand firmly on these guarantees. When his prior counsel failed
to convince the defendant to plead, his attorney put pressure on
the defendant's family.

As stated in the affidavits of the
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defendant and James B. Thorup, the defendant's attorney was a
family friend. He was able to convince the defendant's family that
the defendant should plead guilty.

His family then set forth to

convince the defendant that he should plead guilty. This influence
was more than the defendant could bear.

As a result of this

pressure the defendant's decision to plead guilty was not the
reasoned, well-considered decision that the law requires.

CONCLUSION

This court may allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea
upon a showing of good cause.

Good cause exists when a defendant

did not know or understand the charges against him.

Good cause

also exists where a defendant, even though he may have known and
understood the charges, has been influenced to the point where he
is no longer capable of exercising the clear thinking that is
crucial when making a decision that will impact the rest of his
life.
As both the defendant and his father have stated in their
affidavits, the defendant was never supplied with the documents in
this case.
amended

Without having carefully reviewed the information and

information

the

defendant

could

not

know

and

fully

understand the charges and the elements that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt. Not only was the defendant ignorant as
to what was contained in the documents, the defendant did not even
have an opportunity to review the Statement of Defendant with any

9
level of scrutiny.

The objections the defendant did have to the

language contained in the Statement of Defendant were hushed by his
attorney.
Regardless of whether the court finds that the defendant knew
and understood the charges against him, good cause still exists to
withdraw

the

guilty

pleas

as

the

defendant's

judgment

was

influenced to the point where the defendant was not exercising
reasoned and objective judgment.

As is stated in the affidavits

that despite his attorney's strong advice that he should enter a
plea,

the

defendant

clung

to

his

decision

constitutional rights and proceed to trial.

to

exercise

his

Not being able to

dissuade the defendant, prior counsel brought pressure to bear upon
the defendant's family.

It is important to realize that the

defendant's counsel was also a family friend. Being convinced that
the

defendant

should

plead

guilty,

the

considerable pressure upon the defendant.

family

then

brought

The defendant

is

strongly influenced by his family. The fact that the defendant is
influenced by his family may or may not be a good thing; it makes
no difference.
concerned

The critical point as far as this motion is

is that the defendant surrendered his judgment and

independent thinking.

The defendant made a decision that he

10
otherwise would not have made.

The lack of independent, reasoned

thinking invalidates the defendant's guilty plea.
DATED this v

day of November, 1991

MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
/
'4t±Z-

Shawn u. Turner
Attorneys for Defendant
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HARRY CASTON (4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF DON R. THORUP
Case No. 911002746 FS

v.
DON RALPH THORUP

Judge George E. Ballif
Defendant
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
) ss.
STATE OF UTAH

)

AFFIANT BEING FIRST DULY SWORN states the following:
1.

That he is the defendant in the above-entitled matter.

He has personal knowledge of the matters set forth below.
2.

That on the 18th day of October, 1991, he appeared before

the Court to enter a plea of guilty to Count 1 Theft, a 2nd degree
felony, Count 16 Communications Fraud, a 1st degree felony, Count
66 Computer Fraud, a 2nd degree felony, Count 67 Computer Fraud,
a 2nd degree felony, Count 68 Computer Fraud, a 2nd degree felony,
Count 69 Computer Fraud, a 2nd degree

felony, and

Count 82

2
Racketeering (pattern of unlawful activity), a 2nd degree felony.
Sentencing was scheduled for November 15, 1991.
3.

That I wish, and I have wished since the very second I

entered my plea of guilty, to withdraw my plea.

This request is

made for the following reasons:
(a)

I believe absolutely in my innocence.

and continue to stand by my innocence.

I have always

My plea of guilty was made

under the following conditions:
(1)

My attorney insisted that if I pleaded guilty

the maximum term of imprisonment I would receive would be five (5)
years.

As I later discovered, this information was incorrect.
(2)

Despite my

guilty I stood my ground.

attorney

insisting

that

I plead

My counsel then began contacting my

family, especially my father, and convinced my family that I should
plead guilty.

I have always wanted to please my

father.

My

attorney has been a friend of my family for the last two (2) or
three (3) years. I believe he knew of my emotional attachment to
my father and played on my feelings for him.
(3)
as they were

As my family is extremely important to me and

helping

to

finance my

defense,

their

subsequent

influence on me was more than I could bear.
(4)

I never

had

the

opportunity

documents that were in my attorney's possession.

to

review

the

I never saw any

of the pleadings or correspondence related to my case until
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approximately forty-five (45) minutes before entering my plea on
October 18, 1991.

At that time my attorney presented me only with

the Statement of Defendant.

I was then told to "glance at the

first few pages, you don't have to read the whole thing, then sign
it in Court before the Judge."

At that time I voiced my objection

to the language in the Statement, including that I had devised a
scheme, or that I had acted intentionally and wilfully.

I was told

by my attorney to not be concerned as that was the

"standard

language they use."

I argued back that I did not scheme or

intentionally and wilfully do anything and strongly objected to the
language in the Statement.

I was told again by my attorney that

it was the "standard language" and that I should sign it.
(5)

At

the

time

of

entering

my

plea,

I

was

experiencing the family pressure mentioned above, my business had
failed, I was in jail and could not make the $200,000.00 bail, and
my attorney indicated he could not represent me if I went to trial.
(6)

Even

at

the

arraignment

when

the

Court

repeatedly asked me if I was sure of what I was doing, I wanted to
blurt out that I did not want to plead guilty and that instead I
stood my innocence and wanted to go to trial. My attorney observed
my hesitation in answering the Court, and he poked me in the side
of my abdomen and urged me to enter my plea.
4.

I beg the Court to allow me to withdraw my plea of guilty

and allow me to stand trial so that I may have a jury determine my
innocence.
Don R. Thorup

4

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
1991 by Don R. Thorup.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Annette L. Soelberg
1200 Kennecott BldQr
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
My Commission Expires
July 10.1992

STATE OF UTAH

My Commission E x p i r e s :

ID,

eliz\harry\thorupd.aff

nt-z-

£

day of

fc
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3 a> fl|

HARRY CASTON (4009)
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES B. THORUP
Case No. 911002746 FS

V,

DON RALPH THORUP
Judge George E. Ballif
Defendant
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.
)

AFFIANT BEING FIRST DULY SWORN states the following:
1.

I am the father of the defendant Don Thorup.

I have

personal knowledge of the matters set forth below,
2.

I have known Don's prior attorney, Vernon Romneyf for

approximately three (3) years, Vernon had become a trusted friend
of my family.
3.

Mr. Romney continually told me that Don should plead

guilty to his criminal charges.

As I stated above, I have known

Mr. Romney for the last three (3) years.

He is a respected

2
attorney and I therefore believed him when he told me that my son
should plead guilty.

I trusted his authority and trusted that he

was acting in my son's best interest.
4.

Mr. Romney convinced me that pleading guilty would be the

best thing for my son. Therefore, I began urging Don to listen to
Mr. Romney and plead guilty. Don continually, from the time of his
arrest, objected to pleading guilty and verbalized his objections
to me and to Mr. Romney repeatedly.

I convinced Don to listen to

Mr. Romney and follow his advice.
5.

As the weeks went by prior to Don's arraignment, I became

increasingly doubtful that Mr. Romney was acting in my son's best
interest.

I received the impression that Mr. Romney just wanted

to hurry and get the matter over with so that he could extricate
himself from it.

Mr. Romney indicated to me that he would not

represent Don if the matter went to trial.
6.

Several weeks before the arraignment, Mr. Romney came to

my home to discuss the case with my son, Richard Thorup, and me.
Richard and I told Mr. Romney that we could not give him any more
money up front, that we would have to be billed for his services
and pay his fees as best we could on a monthly basis.

Mr. Romney

told us, "Perhaps you should get a public defender."

Mr. Romney

again indicated he would not help Don if he pleaded not guilty and
the matter went to trial.
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7.

On the day of the arraignment, October 18, 1991, before

he met with his counsel, Don told me he still did not want to plead
guilty.

Again, I begged Don to listen to his attorney and follow

his instructions.
8.

At the arraignment, which I attended, I heard Judge

Ballif ask Don if he was absolutely certain he wanted to plead
guilty.

It was my impression that the Judge was concerned that

Don was unaware of what he was doing.

I was highly and favorably

impressed with the Judge, and sensed a sincere concern on his part
for my son's rights.

I began to think Don should plead not guilty

so that this matter could go to trial and my son would have the
opportunity to have his innocence judged by a jury.
9.

After the arraignment, Don contacted me at home and told

me what had been contained in the Statement of Defendant which he
had signed before the Judge.
contained

therein

which

I was alarmed at the language

indicated

that

Don

had

schemed

and

willfully and intentionally attempted to commit the crimes with
which he was charged. I clearly realized then that the guilty plea
had been a mistake.

I told my son he should not have signed the

Statement and should not have pled guilty. I regret that I allowed
Mr. Romney to convince me that the defendant should plead guilty.
10.

I beg the Court to allow Don to withdraw his plea of

guilty and allow him to stand trial.

j*

mes B.'J3*£>rup

/

4

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
1991 by James B. Thorup.

£

day of November,

C<S>CJC

Kec

*&<r<0£/

ublic
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
JACQUELINE WfLUAMSJ
\

111 North 200 West
Provo. Ut£h &!601
My Commission E x p i r e
I r tbruary6, 1993

STATE OF UTAH
eliz\harry\thorupj.aff

ADDENDUM C
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case Number:

911400476

RULING
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

DONALD RALPH THORUP,
Defendant.
**********

This matter came before the Court pursuant to the
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to seven (7)
separate counts of an eight-four (84) count information filed
against him based upon a plea bargin tendered by the state and
accepted by the defendant eliminating all counts except the seven
enumerated to which he agreed to enter a plea of guilty.

The

agreement also included provisions as to the state recommending
particular sentences to run consecutively, and that defendanr pay
restitution for those who had losses because of his conduct.
On December 6, 1991 a hearing was held at which time
evidence was taken and counsel on both sides presented oral
argument and memorandum of law in support of and opposing the
defendant's motion to withdraw the plea of guilty.
The parties and the Court had the benefit of a transcript
made by the court reporter of proceedings on October 18, 1991 when

the defendant tendered his plea of guilty pursuant to the plea
bargin, and was interrogated by the Court with regard to the
rights being waived by the entry of such a plea and whether the
plea was made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
consequences of such a plea.
The evidence presented by the defendant in support of his
motion came from himself, his father, and a brother.

Evidence

presented by the state was from the defendants, former attorney.
Rule 11 U.R.C.P provides statutory authorization for the
withdrawal of a guilty plea.

The standard set by the Rule which

must be met for a withdrawal of plea consists of "good cause shown
and with leave of court."

In this case the "good cause shown" is

the assertion by the defendant that he did not know the nature of
the charges against him, and that his attorney and family used
undue influence which deprived him of his "decision-making
abilities" which rendered the plea involuntary and would show good
cause supporting his request to withdraw the plea.
A reference to the transcript of the arraignment
proceedings wherein the guilty plea was entered disclosed that the
defendant, Donald Ralph Thorup, a college graduate, appeared
before the Court for arraignment wherein it was disclosed that a
plea bargin had been struck between the parties as hereinabove set
forth.

The terms of the plea bargin were reviewed with the

defendant, and an Amended Information was sworn to before the
Court and ordered filed, and the reading of it was waived by the

defendant.
The Court thereafter interrogated Mr. Thorup as to his
understanding of the plea bargin, and the rights he was giving up
in entering a plea of guilty to the charges contained in the
Amended Information.
A review of the transcript of the proceedings at the time
of arraignment show that the Court and counsel thoroughly reviewed
all of the requirements of Rule 11, U.R.C.P and the case law
interpreting that rule, and the Court has concluded that no good
cause has been shown to set aside the guilty plea accepted by the
Court and found to have been knowingly and voluntarily entered and
that Mr. Thorup had full knowledge of the rights he was giving up
in entering the plea.
The Court further finds that the claim of defendant that
his family, and his attorney denied him his independant decision
making ability by their undue influence is given little
credibility coming from a middle age college graduate having
considerable experience in the commericial world and some exposure
to the criminal procedures (attorney, Romney testified that the
defendant had withheld information about two (2) unrelated
criminal charges against the defendant that were not disclosed to
him) also, the Court repeatedly gave the defendant an opportunity
to withdraw from the plea agreement on many occasions during its
conversations with the defendant by asking if he still wanted to
enter the guilty plea after its consequence had been explained and

the elements of the offense read to him in open court.

Undue

influence from any source would have surfaced at the time of
arraignment and the repeated opportunity the defendant had to
withdraw from the plea bargin while the requirements of Rule 11
were reviewed.
As to the assertions that his attorney used undue
influence, the evidence presented shows nothing more that an
attorney counseling the defendant and his family with regard to
what he considers to be the best approach, knowing all of the
facts from the defendant's point of view and giving his considered
judgment and advice to the defendant and his family that the plea
bargin was in the defendant's best interest.

Not to be persuasive

about the conclusion that the attorney reached, that the plea
bargin was the best route to go, could be considered by some to be
a failure to discharge one's duty to a client,

The Court could

not find from evidence presented on this question that Mr. Romney
in any way abandoned his representation for economic reasons or
because of pressures from the family to change his advice and
reject the plea bargin and enter a plea of not guilty.

It is also

noted that private counsel may withdraw from representation of a
client who refuses to follow his advice.
The defendant having failed to make a good cause showing
that the plea was entered without compliance with the requirements
of Rule 11, the Court denies the defendant's motion to withdraw
his plea.

This matter is set for sentencing on the 10th day of

January, 1992 at 1:00 p.m. be ore the above entitled Court in
Provo, Utah.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

I' day of December, 1991.

BY THE COURT

^GEORGE YK BALLIF, JUDGE

cc:

Sheila Page
Harry Caston

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Appellate No. 920404-CA

DON RALPH THORUP

Priority 2

Defendant and Appellant,

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 1992, I
mailed four copies of Appellant's Brief in the above-entitled
matter to the following:
Paul Van Dam, Esq.
Attorney General
Sheila Page, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Fair Business Enforcement Unit
111 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
DATED this 13th day of July, 1992.
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
£.

•2k
Caston

^

Yikx
rry
L#tt
ttorneys for Appellant

